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Existing search-theoretical models of money have in general abstracted
from the existence and accumulation of other assets, in particular, capital.
In this paper we present a model where the optimal portfolio allocation
decision of agents is explicitly modeled. Trade frictions in a decentralized
consumption goods market give rise to an endogenous role for money. Capi-
tal goods are assumed to be type-speci¯c and traded in a centralized market.
Uninsurable idiosyncratic uncertainty in production and trading opportuni-
ties leads to a non-degenerate distribution of wealth. By focusing on sta-
tionary equilibria we characterize numerically the wealth distribution and
its composition. We further analyze the e®ects of monetary policy on the
equilibrium patterns of exchange, the distribution of wealth, capital accu-
mulation, and welfare. In particular, we show that a moderate expansionary
policy, accomplished via lump-sum transfers, can lead to a steady-state in-
crease in aggregate output, aggregate consumption, capital accumulation,
and welfare.
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The question of what is the optimal rate of in°ation has interested and puzzled
economist for a long time. While most traditional representative agent models
used for monetary policy analysis (for example, the money in the utility function
or cash-in-advance models) prescribe the Friedman's Rule as the optimal monetary
policy rule, the discussion in most Central Banks seems to be centered on what
non-negative, but moderate, rate of in°ation to target. Several explanations have
been proposed for this apparent paradox. Some authors (e.g. Phelps (1973), Coo-
ley and Hansen (1991)) have suggested that, given the need to ¯nance some level of
government expenditures, the in°ation tax collected by following an expansionary
monetary policy might be less distortionary than alternative forms of taxation.1
Other authors have stressed the di±culties in implementing a contractionary mon-
etary policy.
A recent branch in the literature has suggested an alternative explanation which
representative agent models are unable to capture. A common feature to most of
the literature that prescribes the optimality of the Friedman's Rule is that, in
those models, there is completeness of contigent claims markets allowing agents to
perfectly insure against any form of idiosyncratic risk (and thus the justi¯cation
for a representative agent assumption). However, recent fundamental models of
monetary economies based on microfoundations (Levine(1991), Kehoe, Levine, and
Woodford (1992), Molico(1997), Deviatov and Wallace(2001)) have stressed that in
an economy subject to uninsurable (due to the frictions that make money valuable)
idiosyncratic risk (whether modeled as preference shocks, or uncertainty regarding
consumption, production, or trading opportunities) a distributional expansionary
1There is a large literature on optimal taxation and seignorage which we will not discuss here.
2monetary policy can be welfare improving.2 The presence of uninsurable idiosyn-
cratic risk gives rise to endogenous wealth heterogeneity and a potential insurance
role for expansionary monetary policy through redistribution. In these models,
although the same forces that arise in the models for which the Friedman Rule
is optimal are at play, the additional redistributive e®ect of monetary policy can
potentially lead to an in°ationary policy being bene¯cial.3
A limitation of this work is that it assumes an extreme degree of market in-
completeness - money is the only asset.4 In this paper, we extend this literature
by considering a search-theoretical model of money where agents can hold and ac-
cumulate both money and capital. By allowing agents to accumulate capital (and
thus partially self-insure) we might reduce the insurance role provided by an ex-
pansionary monetary policy. On the other hand, by a®ecting the asset's portfolio
allocation decision of agents, monetary policy can potentially a®ect the productive
capacity of the economy. The goal of this paper is to characterize the portfolio allo-
cation decision of the agents, and analyze and quantify the e®ects of expansionary
monetary policy on the stationary equilibrium patterns of exchange, distribution of
prices, wealth portfolio allocation, distributions of money and capital, and welfare.
We consider a search-theoretical model of money where both goods and money
2For other examples in which a redistributive expansionary monetary is bene¯cial in the
presence of uninsurable idiosyncratic risk, see, for example, Edmond (2002), Green and Zhou
(2004), Bhattacharya, Haslag and Martin (2004), Berentsen, Camera and Waller (2005).
3Another branch that has focused on the distributional e®ects of monetary policy is the
limited participation literature. This literature is concerned with the role of monetary policy
in the short run. Recent papers representative of the state of the art in such literature include
Alvarez, Atkeson and Kehoe (2002), Alvarez, Atkeson, and Edmond (2003), Chiu (2004), and
Williamson (2005).
4Other papers in the search monetary literature that have incorporated capital into the model
include Shi (1999a), Shi (1999b), and Arouba, Waller and Wright (2004). In these models, how-
ever, given their tractability assumptions, agents are able to fully insure against any idiosyncratic
risk, leading to a degenerate distribution of wealth (money and capital). In this paper agents
have no access to such risk-sharing mechanism.
3are perfectly divisible. Unlike most of the models in the literature we allow con-
sumers to store their own (and only their own) consumption good, which can be
used for consumption or as an input (capital) in the production of an agents type-
speci¯c production good. By this assumption, we preclude capital (the stored
consumption good) to compete with money as a medium of exchange, allowing it
however to still serve as a store of value and to serve a productive role.5 We assume
that there are two types of markets that open sequentially. A decentralized goods
market where production and trade take place, and a centralize capital market
where agents can re-optimize their asset's portfolio but no production can take
place.6 Trade frictions in the decentralized consumption goods market give rise to
an endogenous role for money. In this market agents meet randomly and bilaterally
and bargain over the amounts of money and goods to be traded. In the centralized
market agents are anonymous and trade money for capital (consumption good).7
The presence of uninsurable idiosyncratic risk in trade opportunities leads to
heterogeneity in wealth and in asset's portfolio choices. Thus the state of the
economy will be described by the joint distribution of money and capital among
the agents in the economy, making it impossible to provide an analytical solution
to the model. As such, we develop a numerical algorithm that allows us to solve
for and characterize stationary equilibria. Furthermore, we use these numerical
5In this paper we abstract from the issue of co-existence of di®erent media-of-exchange and
potential rate-of-return dominance. A recent paper that attempts to address those issues while
abstracting from the redistributive e®ects of monetary policy is Lagos and Rocheteau (2004).
6The role of the centralized market is very di®erent that the one in Lagos and Wright(2005).
There production of general goods takes place in the centralized market. Given the assumption
that current-period utility is linear in labor supply in that market, agents optimally choose to
take the same amount of money holdings into the decentralized market leading to a degenerate
distribution of money. The linearity of preferences over labor supply serves as an insurance
against the idiosyncratic risk the agents face in the decentralized market. Still, in both models
the centralized market serves as a market for liquidity.
7We assume that investment is reversible, that is, agents can eat their stored consumption
good (capital) at the end of any period. So far, we have not analyzed the implications of the
alternative assumption - irreversibility of investment.
4methods to provide quantitative answers to monetary policy questions.
Regarding the e®ects of monetary policy, we show that money is always neutral
in the long-run and also in the short-run if monetary injections are accomplished
via proportional transfers. However, if the transfer mechanism generates a redis-
tribution of wealth, increases in the level of the money supply will have short-run
real e®ects. Furthermore, regarding the e®ects of changes in the rate of monetary
growth, we show that proportional transfers are superneutral but that redistribu-
tive lump-sum transfer will have permanent real e®ects. Our preliminary numerical
results suggest that a moderate rate of monetary expansion can lead to an increase
in steady-state aggregate output, aggregate consumption, capital accumulation,
and welfare. Also, the average fraction of time spent working might decrease. As
such, our example suggests that Friedman's Rule might not be optimal in such
environment.8
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we describe
the model economy. In section 3, we de¯ne a recursive competitive equilibrium for
this economy. We then proceed to develop and present a numerical algorithm that
allows us to compute stationary equilibria of the model. In section 5, we use this
algorithm to characterize the stationary equilibria of the model and to illustrate
the e®ects of a redistributive expansionary monetary policy. Section 6 presents
some discussion and concludes.
8Note that, due to computational restrictions, we only compare across steady states and thus
ignore potential important e®ects along the transition path. In particular, given the endogenous
capital accumulation and labor supply decisions, particular care in the interpretation of the
results is required.
52 The Model
Population, Goods and Specialization
Time is discrete. There is a [0;1] continuum of in¯nitely lived agents who
specialize in the consumption, storage, and production of perfectly divisible goods.
There are N varieties of goods and N types of agents, i = 1;:::;N (N ¸ 3), with
an equal measure 1
N of agents of each type. Agent type i consumes good i, has the
ability to store solely good i, and produces good i + 1 (mod N)9.
Technology
Production requires the use of capital (an agent's stored consumption good)
and labor inputs. Capital is production good speci¯c. The production of good
i+1 requires the input of good i. Agent type i combines good i and his own labor
e®ort to produce good i + 1 according to a Cobb-Douglas production function:
yi+1 = f(ki;l) = Ak
®
i l
1¡®; 0 < ® < 1; A > 0:
Capital depreciates at rate 0 < ± < 110.
Preferences
Agents derive utility u(c) from consuming c units of their type-speci¯c con-
sumption good and disutility g(l) from providing l units of labor e®ort. Assume
u is twice continuously di®erential with u(0) = 0, u0(c) > 0, and u00(c) < 0. Also,
assume g is twice continuously di®erentiable with g(0) = 0, g0(l) > 0, g00(l) > 0,
9Note that, unlike what it is commonly assumed in the search-theoretical literature, e.g. Trejos
and Wright (1995), we allow agents to store goods which can be used as an input in production.
However, each type of agent can only store his/her own consumption good which prevents goods
from being used as a medium-of-exchange, although they can serve as a store-of-value. The
issues of coexistence of di®erent media-of-exchange and potential rate of return dominance are
interesting and important but we will not pursue them in this paper.
10For simplicity, we assume capital depreciates at the same rate independently of whether it
has been used in production or simply stored. More generally, one could consider di®erent rates
of depreciation.
6liml!0g0(l) = 0, and liml!1g0(l) = +1. The per-period utility is given by
U(c;l) = u(c) ¡ g(l):
Agents discount the future at discount factor 0 < ¯ < 1.
For notational convenience, let v(y;k) denote the disutility of producing an








In addition to capital, in this economy there is another, perfectly divisible, and
costlessly storable, object which cannot be produced or consumed by any private
individual, called ¯at money. Agents can hold any nonnegative amount of money
^ m 2 <+. Let Mt denote the money supply at the beginning of period t.
Markets
There are two markets which open sequentially during each period. A decen-
tralized goods market and a centralized capital market. In the decentralized goods
market agents meet randomly and bilaterally, bargain, produce, and trade. In the
centralized capital market agents are anonymous, and can optimize their assets
portfolio by purchasing or selling capital, but cannot produce. Note that, the
centralized market is a market for liquidity where stored goods can be traded for
money but where no production is allowed. Allowing for production in this market
would eliminate the need for a medium of exchange.11
Monetary Policy
11The role of the centralized market is very di®erent than the one in Lagos and Wright(2005).
There agents can produce, trade and consume general goods. Given the assumption that utility
is linear in labor supply, agents are able to fully insure against the idiosyncratic uncertainty they
face in the decentralized market, leading in equilibrium to a degenerate distribution of wealth.
7Agents receive monetary transfers, ^ ¿t(^ m;k) at the entrance of the centralized
market, before trade occurs. In what follows we express all nominal variables as








The aggregate money supply grows at a constant rate ¹,
Mt+1 = (1 + ¹)Mt:
Decision Timing
The timing of the model is as follows. At the beginning of each period agents
are randomly matched with a potential trading partner in the decentralized goods
market. If in the meeting there is single-coincidence-of-wants,12 agents bargain over
the quantity of money and goods to be exchanged, and production and exchange
take place. For convenience, we assume that capital depreciates after the decen-
tralized market closes. After that, the centralized capital market opens. Monetary
transfers take place, agents choose consumption and the asset's portfolio allocation
for next period, trade, and consume.13
This concludes the description of the environment. In what follows, we will
build gradually towards the de¯nition of equilibrium.
12Note that, by assumption, we excluded the possibility of double-coincidence-of-wants meet-
ings and thus barter. Allowing for barter does not change qualitatively the analysis of the paper.
13We assume that investment is reversible, i.e., agents can eat their stored consumption/capital
good. Furthermore, they can potentially purchase consumption good from other agents of their
type. The price of the good however, will never be cheaper that the price at which an agent can
acquire the good in the decentralized market, as will be shown below.
83 Equilibrium
In this section we de¯ne a recursive equilibrium for this economy. We begin by
describing the individual and aggregate state variables. An individual's state vari-
able consists of his current portfolio of money balances, as fraction of the current
money supply, and capital. For notational convenience, we denote an individual's
state variable by s ´ (m;k), where s 2 S ´ R+ £ R+. The aggregate state vari-
able is, in turn, de¯ned as the current probability measure over money holdings
(measured as fraction of the current money supply) and capital, denoted ¸. Let
¸ : S ! [0;1], where S ´ BR+ £ BR+ denotes the Borel subsets of S.
The agent takes as given the law of motion of the aggregate state variable,
¸0 = H(¸), where prime denotes the future period. Later, we will describe in
detail the law of motion. Also, the agent takes as given the price of capital in
the centralized market, pk, as a function of the current aggregate state, that is,
pk : ¤ ! R+ n f0g, where ¤ denotes the space of probability measures over S.
In what follows we describe the value functions, taking as given the terms of
trade in the decentralized market. Let y(sb;ss;¸) and d(sb;ss;¸) denote, respec-
tively, the amount of goods and money (measured as a fraction of the current
money supply) traded in the decentralized goods market between a buyer with in-
dividual state sb, and a seller with individual state ss, when the aggregate state is
¸, taking as given the pricing function pk. Later, we will specify the determination
of the terms of trade.
Let V (s;¸) be the value function for an agent holding portfolio s, when the
aggregate state is ¸, at the entrance of the decentralized market. Assume V (¢;¸) is
a continuous function. Also, let W(¹ m;¹ k;¸) be the value of entering the centralized
capital market holding the portfolio (¹ m;¹ k) when the aggregate state is ¸.
9We can then write the following functional equation expressing the relationship
















W[m;(1 ¡ ±)k;¸]: (1)
The ¯rst integral term on the r.h.s. is the expected value of being a buyer, the
second integral term is the expected value of being a seller, and the last term is
the expected value of a no single-coincidence-of-wants meeting, in which case no
trade occurs.
The value of entering the centralized market holding portfolio ¹ s, given the
aggregate state ¸, is de¯ned as
W(¹ s;¸) = max
c¸0;s0¸0












(1 + ¹) + k
0 (3)
¸
0 = H(¸): (4)
By the Theorem of the Maximum, W(¢;¸) is a continuous function and set
of optimizers is a nonempty, compact-valued, and u.h.c correspondence. By the
Measurable Selection Theorem, this correspondence permits a measurable selection.
14For now, assume d(¢;¢;¸), y(¢;¢;¸), and W(¢;¸) are measurable functions. We will later
show that, given V (¢;¸) is continuous, W(¢;¸) is continuous, and thus measurable, and that
d(¢;¢;¸) and y(¢;¢;¸) can be de¯ned as being measurable selections from a u.h.c. correspondence.
10De¯ne Â, ª, and · as (measurable) sections of such correspondence, with
c = Â(¹ s;¸) (5)
m
0 = ª(¹ s;¸) (6)
k
0 = ·(¹ s;¸): (7)
We will now describe the determination, by bargaining, of the terms of trade in
the decentralized market. We will adopt the generalized Nash bargaining solution
where the buyer has bargaining power µ, 0 < µ < 1, and with the threat point for
an agent given by his continuation value W(¹ s;¸).
For notational convenience, de¯ne §b(¹ y; ¹ d;sb;ss;¸) and §s(¹ y; ¹ d;sb;ss;¸) to be,
respectively, the net surplus from trading an amount of good ¹ y for a fraction of the
current money supply ¹ d, for a buyer and a seller holding respectively, the portfolios
sb and ss, given the aggregate state ¸.
§b(¹ y; ¹ d;sb;ss;¸) ´ W[mb ¡ ¹ d;(1 ¡ ±)kb + ¹ y;¸] ¡ W[mb;(1 ¡ ±)kb;¸]
§s(¹ y; ¹ d;sb;ss;¸) ´ ¡v(¹ y;ks) + W[ms + ¹ d;(1 ¡ ±)ks;¸] ¡ W[ms;(1 ¡ ±)ks;¸]:
Consider the following generalized Nash bargaining problem.
§(sb;ss;¸) = max
(¹ y;¹ d)2G(sb;ss;¸)
§b(¹ y; ¹ d;sb;ss;¸)
µ§s(¹ y; ¹ d;sb;ss;¸)
1¡µ; (8)
where G : S £ S ! S is a correspondence de¯ned by G(sb;ss;¸) ´ f(¹ y; ¹ d) 2 S :
0 · ¹ d · mb;0 · ¹ y · Ak®
s g. Once again, by the Theorem of the Maximum15
and the Measurable Selection Theorem the correspondence D(sb;ss;¸) = f(¹ y; ¹ d) 2
G(sb;ss;¸) : §b(¹ y; ¹ d;sb;ss;¸)µ§s(¹ y; ¹ d;sb;ss;¸)1¡µ = §(sb;ss;¸)g permits a mea-
surable selection. De¯ne y(sb;ss;¸) : S £ S ! R+ and d(sb;ss;¸) : S £ S ! R+
15Note that, given W(¢;¢;¸) is continuous, the objective function is continuous. Furthermore,
it is easy to show that the correspondence G is compact-valued and continuous.
11to be (measurable) sections of such correspondence.16
Before de¯ning a recursive equilibrium for this economy, we describe the law
of motion ¸0 = H(¸). We begin by describing the evolution of the aggregate
state from the beginning of the centralized market to the beginning of the next





1; if [ª(¹ s;¸);·(¹ s;¸)] 2 B;
0; otherwise.
(9)
Given that, for each ¹ s, ¦(¹ s;¢;¸) is a probability measure on (S;S), and, for each
B 2 S, ¦(¢;B;¸) is a S-measurable function17, ¦ is a well de¯ned transition func-






¦(¹ s;B;¸) ­(d¹ s) 8B 2 S: (10)
We now describe the evolution of the aggregate state from the beginning of
the decentralized market to the beginning of the centralized market. Let T =
fbuyer;seller;neitherg and de¯ne the space (T;T ), where T is the ¾-algebra.
De¯ne the probability measure ¿ : T ! [0;1], with ¿(buyer) = ¿(seller) = 1
N, and
¿(neither) = N¡2
N . Then, (T;T ;¿) is a measure space. De¯ne an event to be a
pair e = (t;s), where t 2 T and s 2 S. Intuitively, t denotes and agents trading
status and s the portfolio of his current trading partner. Let (E;E) be the space
of such events, where E = T £S and E = T £S. Furthermore, let » : E ! [0;1] be
16Note that, since (0;0) 2 G(sb;ss;¸) any solution to the Nash bargaining problem
satis¯es the participation constraints, that is, §b[y(sb;ss;¸);d(sb;ss;¸);sb;ss;¸] ¸ 0 and
§s[y(sb;ss;¸);d(sb;ss;¸);sb;ss;¸] ¸ 0.
17This follows immediately from the measurability of ª(¢;¸) and ·(¢;¸).
12the product probability measure. De¯ne the mapping Á(s;e) : S £ E ! S, where
Á(s;e) =
8
> > > <
> > > :
[m ¡ d(s;¢;¸);(1 ¡ ±)k + y(s;¢;¸)]; if e = (buyer;¢);
[m + d(¢;s;¸);(1 ¡ ±)k]; if e = (seller;¢);
[m;(1 ¡ ±)k]; otherwise.
(11)
We can now de¯ne ¡ : S £ S ! [0;1] to be
¡(s;B;¸) ´ »(fe 2 EjÁ(s;e) 2 Bg): (12)




¡(s;B;¸) ¸(ds) 8B 2 S: (13)
Finally, we can describe the law of motion of the aggregate state as
¸





¦(¹ s;B;¸)¡(s;d¹ s;¸) ¸(ds) 8B 2 S: (14)
We are ¯nally ready to de¯ne a recursive equilibrium for this economy.
De¯nition 1 (Recursive Equilibrium)A recursive equilibrium is a list of:
Pricing function: pk : ¤ ! R+ n f0g;
Law of motion: H : ¤ ! ¤;
Value functions: V : S £ ¤ ! R+ and W : S £ ¤ ! R+;
Policy functions: Â : S £ ¤ ! R+, ª : S £ ¤ ! R+, · : S £ ¤ ! R+; and
Terms of trade y : S £ S £ ¤ ! R+, and d : S £ S £ ¤ ! R+;
such that:
18By construction, for each s, ¡(s;¢;¸) is a probability measure on (S;S). Furthermore, given
the measurability of d(¢;¢;¸) and y(¢;¢;¸), ¡(¢;B;¸) is a S-measurable function.
131. given the pricing function, the terms of trade, and the policy functions, the
value functions satisfy the functional equations (1) and (2);
2. given the value functions and the law of motion of the aggregate state, the
policy functions solve (2);
3. given the value functions, the terms of trade solve (8);
4. given the terms of trade the law of motion of the aggregate state is de¯ned
by (14);




S ª(¹ s;¸)¡(s;d¹ s;¸) ¸(ds) = 1.
In the remainder of the paper we will only focus on stationary equilibria, where
¸ = H(¸).
4 The Numerical Algorithm
In this section we brie°y present the numerical algorithm developed for ¯nding
stationary monetary equilibria of the model and discuss some computational con-
siderations.
The basic strategy of the algorithm is to iterate on a mapping de¯ned by the
value function equations (1) and (2) and the law of motion of the aggregate state
given by equation (14). Special care is taken in keeping track of the distribution
of wealth and its composition across iterations. In particular, we keep track of a
large sample of agent's wealth portfolios and use non-parametric density estimation
methods. We begin the algorithm at the entrance of the centralized market.
A brief description of the algorithm follows:
14Step 1. Given and initial guess for the distribution of money and capital at the
entrance of the centralized market, draw a large sample of agent's wealth
portfolios.19
Step 2. De¯ne a grid on the state space of money and capital holdings, (m;k)
and an initial guess for the value function at the entrance of the decentralized
market, V 0(m;k), by de¯ning the value of the function at the gridpoints and
using interpolation methods to evaluate the function at any other point.20
Step 3. Given the sample of wealth portfolios at the entrance of the centralized
market and the value function at the entrance of the decentralized market,
¯nd the market clearing price by solving the centralized market problem (2)
for all agents in the sample and iterating on the price, pk, given an initial
guess, until the market clears.
Step 4. Given the market clearing price and the sample of wealth portfolios, de¯ne
the maximum value of real wealth, at the entrance of the centralized market
(post-monetary injection), wmax. Compute W(¢) by solving the centralized
market problem on a grid on [0;4¤wmax], and using interpolation methods
to evaluate the function at any other point.21
Step 5. Given the market clearing price, update the wealth portfolios of the agents
by solving their optimization problem. For the steps that follow, it turns
19A sample of 10,000 observations is used.
20The grid must be made large enough so that no attempts of evaluation of V outside the grid
are made while solving the centralized market problem, given the guess for the distribution of
wealth at its entrance. A grid of 100 by 100 points and bi-cubic spline interpolation are used.
21Note that, given pk and the types of monetary transfers studied (proportional and lump-
sum), only the total amount of real wealth, and not its composition, matter at the entrance
of the centralized market. Since strict concavity of both V and W cannot be assured, special
care must be taken in solving the optimization problem and keeping track of W. Furthermore,
when estimating W agents are constrained to consume any amount of real wealth (post-monetary
transfer) in excess of 2 ¤ wmax. By construction, in equilibrium this constraint will never be
binding.
15out to be computationally more convenient to keep track of the distribution
of real wealth at the entrance of the decentralized market, and a portfolio
allocation rule, instead of the joint distribution of money and capital. Again,
we keep track of the portfolio allocation rule by de¯ning a grid on [0;wmax]
(the space of real wealth) and using interpolation methods, being careful
to keep track of any possible discontinuity points. The distribution of real
wealth is estimated using Gaussian kernel non-parametric density estimation
methods.22
Step 6. Given wmax, rede¯ne the grid on (m;k) by setting the maximum capital
holdings to 2 ¤ wmax and the maximum money holdings to 2 ¤ wmax ¤ pk.
These bounds are large enough to guarantee that the soon to be updated
function V will never be evaluated outside the grid at any iteration.
Step 7. Given the market clearing price at the centralized market, the value func-
tion W(¢), the distribution of real wealth at the entrance of the decentralized
market, and the portfolio allocation rule, update the value function V (m;k)
by using the mapping de¯ned by equation (1) to compute its value at the new
gridpoints and re-estimating the interpolant coe±cients. Note that, the nu-
merical computation of the integrals requires solving the bargaining problem
(8) numerous times.
Step 8. For each individual on the sample, update their wealth portfolio by simu-
lating their meetings. Randomly determine their trading status in a meeting
(buyer, seller, or neither) and, using the estimated distribution of real wealth
and the portfolio allocation rule, the wealth portfolio of his trading partner.
22The reason for keeping track of the distribution of real wealth and the portfolio allocation
rule instead of estimating directly the joint distribution of money and capital is that it makes
the computation of the expectations (integrals) in equation (1) much more expedite. Still, the
joint and marginal distributions can easily be computed if desired.
16Reapeat steps 3 to 8 until convergence is achieved.
A parallel Fortran 90 implementation of this algorithm is available from the
authors by request. Given the computational complexity of the problem, for each
parametrization of the model, convergence requires several days (depending criti-
cally on the value of the discount factor) using approximately 20 Opteron proces-
sors.
5 Preliminary Numerical Results: An Illustra-
tive Example
In what follows we use the numerical algorithm presented in the last section to ¯nd
and characterize stationary equilibria of the model. Although we are currently in
the process of calibrating the model to certain data observations, like the average
level of velocity, capital-output ratio, fraction of time spent working, etc, for which
the model delivers predictions, for now we will take the parametrization below as
an illustrative example. We use this example to characterize a typical features of a
stationary equilibrium of the model and illustrate the potential e®ects of monetary
policy.
To solve numerically the model we adopt the following functional forms for the
utility of consumption and the disutility of supplying labor e®ort.
u(c) =





17In addition, for now, we de¯ne a model period to be one year and pick parameter










Table 1: Parameter Values
Some of these parameters, given we take a model period to be one year, are
standard. For example, ¯ and ± imply respectively, an annual interest rate of 4%
and an annual depreciation rate of 7%. The others are taken from the original
calibration in Lagos and Wright(2005). Ideally, we would like the model to match
the average annual consumption velocity of money in the data. For the period
1959-2002, depending on whether one uses the monetary base or M1 as a measure
of the money supply, these values are respectively, 11.2 and 4.0. As it will be clear
below, to match the consumption velocity of money will require to calibrate the
model to a shorter period than a year. In fact, by construction, the annual version
cannot generate a velocity above 1
N given that only 1
N of the agents are buyers in
each period of the model. Thus, even setting N = 3, the smallest possible number,
will imply that a model period of one year cannot generate high enough velocity.
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Figure 1: The Distribution of Wealth at the Entrance of the Decentralized Market
5.1 Equilibrium Characterization
Given the functional forms and parameter values described above, we begin by
analyzing the distribution of wealth and the portfolio allocation decision of the
agents. Unless otherwise noted, we consider the case where there is no monetary
growth, ¹ = 0. Figure 1 illustrates the typical distribution of wealth at the entrance
of the decentralized market. Note that, not surprisingly, the distribution of wealth
is non-degenerate and, for the parameter values we use, tends to be relatively
jagged23. The jaggedness of the wealth distribution can be better understood once
one looks at the distribution of prices in the decentralized market and the portfolio
allocation decision of the agents.
23The jaggedness of the wealth distribution is robust and is not a result of undersmoothing in
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Figure 2: The Distribution of Prices in the Decentralized Market
Figure 2, shows the distribution of prices in the decentralized market, measured
as percentage of the current money supply. The fact that the model generates price
dispersion is not surprising if one notes that, in general, the terms of trade in the
decentralized market will depend on both the wealth of the buyer and the seller
as well as on their portfolio composition. For a given portfolio of a seller, the
wealthier the buyer, holding constant his money holdings, the lower the price at
which trade occurs. Also, for a given portfolio of the buyer and as long as the
money constraint of the buyer is not binding, the wealthier the seller, keeping
constant the amount of capital she holds, the higher the price at which trade
occurs. (However, after a certain level of wealth of the seller, the money constraint
of the buyer will be binding which will allow him to extract a higher fraction of
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Figure 3: Fraction of Wealth Held as Real Money Balances
of wealth. On the other hand, the terms of trade will depend on the amount of
money the buyer is holding and the amount of capital the seller has, and thus on
their portfolio allocation decision. For a given seller's portfolio, the more money
the buyer brings to the bargaining table, holding ¯x his wealth, the worst terms of
trade he will face (higher price). In particular, it is important to note that, if the
money constraint of the buyer is binding, he is able to extract a higher fraction
of the total surplus. Also, for a given buyer's portfolio, the higher the amount of
capital the seller brings into the bargaining, holding ¯xed his wealth, the more he
will be willing to produce and thus the lower the price. Agents, are fully aware of all
these considerations when making their optimal portfolio allocation decision. Thus
the equilibrium price distribution depends on the equilibrium portfolio allocation
decision and vice versa.
21Figure 3 depicts the fraction of wealth held as real money balances at the
entrance of the decentralized market. In what follows, I will try to provide some
intuition to this optimal portfolio allocation decision. First consider the problem
faced by a relatively poor agent. As a buyer, it is most likely that even if he holds
a large fraction of his wealth as money, his money holdings are going to be binding
most of the time24. As such he will be able to extract a larger fraction of the total
surplus from trade. On the other hand, by holding a large fraction of his wealth
as money he maximizes the expected value of the total surplus from trade. As a
seller, even if she were to hold a large fraction of her wealth as capital, the cost
of production would be high, and thus she would not be willing to produce much
output. As a result the expected value of the total surplus from trade is small.
Furthermore, since the agent is relatively poor, she would be able to extract a small
fraction of the total surplus. Thus, a relatively poor agent will choose to hold a
large fraction of their wealth as real money balances. As an agents wealth increases
however, there is less incentive to leave a large fraction of that wealth as money.
Note that, if the agent were to keep a constant fraction of his wealth as money,
eventually, as his wealth increased, as a buyer, his money holdings constraint would
be seldom binding. This would mean that the agent would be able to extract a
smaller fraction of the total surplus. On the other hand as a seller, by holding
more capital, the agent reduces the cost of production and increases the expected
value of the total surplus from trade. As a result, in general, the wealthier the
agent, the higher fraction of wealth he will hold as capital. However, given that
there is diminishing marginal productivity of capital, eventually the expected gain
of holding any additional capital is dominated by the depreciation cost of capital.
After that point, as long as the rate of in°ation is low enough, agents rather store
24Note that, on average other agents are going to be richer than him and thus have more
(endogenous) bargaining power.
22any additional wealth as money.25
Note that, in general, there are two types of situations that can arise in a
bilateral meetings: either the money constraint of the buyer is binding or it is
not. If the constraint is binding, agents will trade on average at a lower price, if
it is not the price on average will be higher. This fact, together with the optimal
asset's portfolio allocation and the distribution of wealth imply that the price
distribution might not be unimodal. In turn, the fact that the distribution of
prices is not unimodal leads to the jaggedness of the equilibrium distribution of
wealth.
Finally, ¯gure 4 shows consumption as a function of the wealth of the agent at
the entrance of the centralized market.
5.2 The E®ects of Monetary Policy
We will now address the e®ects of monetary policy. First, it is easy to show that
changes in the level of the money supply are neutral in the long-run. To see this,
note that although changes in the level of the money supply will have, in general,
real e®ects in the short-term due to a one time redistribution of real wealth among
agents in the centralized market, that change will not have permanent e®ects (the
distribution of real wealth will eventually converge back to the same invariant
distribution) and thus there will be no long-run real e®ects. Moreover, it is easy to
see from equation (3) that, if the increase in the money supply is accomplished via
proportional transfers, there will be no redistribution of wealth and thus money
will be both short-run and long-run neutral. It follows that, if we consider the case
25Note that, since capital depreciates, as long as the rate of in°ation is low enough, money
is a better store of value. For high rates of in°ation though, capital is a better store of value.
However, money also plays a role as medium of exchange and capital has a productive role. At
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Figure 4: Consumption as Function of the Wealth at the Entrance of the Central-
ized Market.
24of proportional transfers, money is also short-run and long-run superneutral, i.e.
changes in the rate of monetary growth will have no short-run or long-run e®ects
on any real variable.
A more interesting case for our analysis is the one where money is injected via
lump-sum transfers. These will have redistributive e®ects and, in general, lead
to a permanent change in the distribution of wealth. In this case, changes in the
rate of monetary growth will have both short-run and long-run real e®ects. At
this moment, we are only able to solve the model for stationary equilibria of the
model and thus we will not address any short-run e®ects of in°ation. Further-
more, we will simply compare across steady-states with di®erent rates of monetary
growth/in°ation ignoring the transition path. The following table illustrates the
e®ects of di®erent in°ationary policies.
Rate of In°ation (¹) 0% 2% 5% 10% 20%
Output (Y) 0.162 0.169 0.179 0.182 0.176
Consumption (C) 0.138 0.142 0.146 0.147 0.142
Capital (K) 0.341 0.390 0.461 0.503 0.493
Average Hours 0.248 0.239 0.236 0.231 0.239
Wealth (W = K + M
Pk) 1.153 0.527 0.542 0.567 0.547
C/Y 0.85 0.84 0.82 0.81 0.81
K/Y 2.10 2.31 2.58 2.78 2.80
M/Pc 0.978 0.655 0.542 0.508 0.462
M/Pk 0.812 0.137 0.080 0.064 0.054
Pk=Pc 1.20 4.78 6.77 7.94 8.55
Velocity 0.17 0.26 0.33 0.33 0.33
M=Pk
W 0.42 0.26 0.15 0.13 0.10
Ex-ante Welfare 138.78 139.32 139.87 140.31 140.27
Table 2: E®ects of Expansionary Monetary Policy - Lump-sum Transfers.
25Note that moderate rates of in°ation lead to a higher level of aggregate output,
aggregate consumption, aggregate capital stock, and ex-ante welfare. It also leads
to a reduction in the average fraction of time spent working.
In what follows we will try to provide some intuition for these results by an-
alyzing the di®erent e®ects at work here. First note that the lump-sum money
creation has a distributional e®ect. By receiving the same amount of real money
balances, poor individuals become relative wealthier and wealthier individuals rel-
atively poorer. This tends to decrease the dispersion of wealth. Ceteris paribus,
since poor individuals have a higher marginal propensity to consume out of their
wealth, this leads to an increase in aggregate consumption and welfare. How-
ever, the portfolio allocation decision is also a®ected. For higher rates of in°ation,
money becomes a worse store of value, leading all agents to increase their holdings
of capital and decrease their real money balances (Tobin e®ect). The increase in
capital holdings leads sellers to be willing to produce more output while decreasing
the cost of production (and hours worked - e®ort) and thus to increase the amount
of aggregate wealth, which leads to an additional increase in consumption. How-
ever, as in°ation increases, money becomes less valuable and thus agents are less
willing to hold real money money balances for transaction purposes (real balance
e®ect) and to produce for money. This discourages the accumulation of capital
since its productive role becomes less important. Eventually, the decrease in the
value of money and capital and decrease in capital accumulation lead to less trade
occurring in the decentralized market, less output being produce, increase in the
hours worked, and a decrease in consumption and welfare. It is interesting to note
that, as in°ation increases, the average price in the decentralized market grows
slower that the price in the centralized market. This is due to the adjustments
in the wealth portfolios and its e®ects on the terms of trade in the decentralized
26market.
Looking at the results for velocity, real money balances and the fraction of
aggregate wealth held as real money balances it becomes clear that by considering
a period to be an year we made search frictions too severe and magni¯ed the role
of money as a medium of exchange. This explains the large magnitudes of the
e®ects and the high level of welfare maximizing in°ation. We expect that with a
proper calibration these numbers will become more reasonable. Still, the model
suggested that velocity is increasing with in°ation as the extensive margin of trade
increases.
6 Conclusion
In this paper we extended the literature on fundamental models of money by
considering a search-theoretical model where agents were allowed to hold and ac-
cumulate both money and capital. In the model, the frictions that give rise to a
role for money lead to uninsurable idiosyncratic uncertainty regarding trading op-
portunities and a non-degenerate distribution of wealth. We developed a numerical
algorithm that allowed us to numerically characterize stationary equilibria and to
analyze the e®ects of monetary policy on the equilibrium patterns of exchange, the
distribution of wealth, its composition, capital accumulation, and welfare, among
others.
Regarding the e®ects of monetary policy, we have shown that money is always
neutral in the long-run and also in the short-run if monetary injections are accom-
plished via proportional transfers. However, if the transfer mechanism generates
a redistribution of wealth, increases in the level of the money supply will have
short-run real e®ects. Furthermore, regarding the e®ects of changes in the rate of
27monetary growth, we show that proportional transfers are superneutral but that
redistributive lump-sum transfer will have permanent real e®ects. Our preliminary
numerical results suggest that a moderate rate of monetary expansion can lead to
an increase in steady-state aggregate output, aggregate consumption, capital ac-
cumulation, and welfare. Also, the average fraction of time spent working might
decrease. These results are suggestive that moderate in°ationary policies might be
bene¯cial for welfare and help conciliate the apparent paradox between the optimal
de°ationary monetary policy prescribed by most traditional monetary models, the
Friedman Rule, and the mildly in°ationary practice of most Central Banks. An-
other contribution of this paper is to bring fundamental models of money closer to
being able to address monetary policy questions, including providing quantitative
answers, that previously could only be addressed using reduced form models.
One thing to note is that, in this model, we precluded agents from entering
into credit arrangements in the centralized market or even to trade claims on
capital, by assuming anonymity. If allowed, agents would certainly want to do so.
However, the point of the paper is exactly to analyze the e®ects of monetary policy
in a world where such risk-sharing mechanisms might be absent for some forms of
idiosyncratic uncertainty.
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